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Abstract. Computer security has traditionally been assessed from a technical point of view. In 
this paper, we wish to adopt a cognitive standpoint and investigate some of the cognitive 
processes involved in computer security. One angle which is not considered very often is the 
active role played by legal users of systems in impairing the level of protection. In this paper, we 
thus attempt to highlight the cognitive processes underlying security impairments by legal users. 
This approach relies on the concept of trade-off. At the end of the paper, we propose a short 
usability-centered set of recommendations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Our society is becoming more and more dependent on computer systems, which nowadays are 
used in everyday life, from business to banking, from entertainment to healthcare. Most of these 
systems are interconnected through the internet, which inherently is very open and vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. Attacks on these systems cause a lot of inconvenience at the very least, and in 
some cases may lead to financial or safety consequences. Therefore, securing computer systems 
has become a very important part of system design, development and deployment. 
 
Security has been very often addressed from the attackers’ side. From this angle, the emphasis 
has classically been on the means used to break into systems. However productive this research 
area has been and still is, it tends to blur the exact role of the legal users1 who are also actively 
involved in computer security. It seems to the authors that this other angle is worth exploring as 
well. Moreover, as part of the DIRC2 research, we are interested in interdisciplinary aspects of 
computing. For these reasons, some aspects of the role of legal users regarding security are 
addressed in this paper. 
 
Computer security is an area which has not been extensively investigated by cognitive scientists. 
It nonetheless offers an interesting aspect in the sense that there are conflicting objectives held 
by some of the actors of a single system, namely attackers and legal users. It follows that 
depending on the goal that a user is pursuing (attack or legal use), the use of a given computer 
system will differ dramatically. Whereas the role of attackers are pretty clear, those of a legal user 
regarding security are more subtle. Stemming from this assumption, we will examine some of the 
legal user’s practices and shed some light on the mental processes involved. We will try to assess 
                                                 
1 In this paper, legal users will refer to a large number of actors, including end-users, security officers, managers and 
designers. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. We only wish to build a simple category of actors who are 
concerned about security but are not attackers. 
2 DIRC (Dependability: an Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration) is a UK-based interdisciplinary research project 
on the dependability of computer-based systems. Visit DIRC at http://www.dirc.org.uk. 
the extent to which computer security can be interpreted in terms of a balance between a 
number of factors on legal users’ side. The approach we adopt here relies on trade-offs.  
2. TRADE-OFFS IN THE WILD 
Since Simon (1957) and his concept of bounded rationality, it is accepted that human actions do 
not reach perfection but instead seek an acceptable level of performance with respect to their 
goals and what the cognitive resources allow. The fact that the cognitive system never aims at 
handling all the data available in the environment is a central aspect of the cognitive resources 
saving strategy. As a consequence, cognitive acts are a trade-off between cost and some sort of 
satisfaction. An individual does not have an infinite amount of time or effort to allocate to a 
given goal. Instead, he or she seeks an answer which balances cost and efficiency in the best way. 
This strategy is put in place for the majority of human actions. Interestingly enough, the 
drawback with trade-offs in security is that they often introduce the opportunity for a threat. 
Before we consider computer security, it can be useful to have a look at a field example. 
Although the latter is quite remote from computing, we think it puts things clearly and shows 
how the parameters of a trade-off are manipulated by humans. 
 
On December 30, 1999, in Tokaimura (Japan), a criticality accident3 occurred at the JCO nuclear 
fuel processing plant, causing the death of two workers (see Furuta et al., 2000). The immediate 
cause of the accident was the pouring of approximately 15kg of uranium into a precipitation 
tank, a procedure requiring mass and volume control. The workers’ task was to process seven 
batches of uranium in order to produce a uranium solution. The tank required to process this 
solution is called a buffer column. At JCO, its dimensions were 17.5 cm in diameter and 2.2 m in 
depth, owing to criticality safe geometry4. The inside of this tank was known to be difficult to 
cleanse. In addition, it was positioned only 10 cm above the floor, making it difficult to collect 
the uranium solution from the bottom of the column. Thus, workers illegally opted for using 
another (larger) tank called precipitation tank. Due to its dimensions, this latter tank was not 
geometrically safe but it was positioned 1 m above the floor. Moreover, it was equipped with a 
stir propeller making it easier to use for homogenising the uranium solution. The pouring of the 
seven batches at once triggered the criticality accident. Its causes were rooted in a complex 
combination of deviant organisational practices. Among these, pressures from the managerial 
team to increase the production without enough regard to safety implications and lack of crew 
training played a significant role. 
In hindsight, we speculate that the operators have traded-off productivity and practicality against 
risk. As their knowledge about critical uranium masses was poor, they were unaware that they 
were crossing a safety boundary. This case is an instance of how trade-offs can go wrong. With 
this example, we want to highlight the workarounds that operators often implement in order to 
perform daily actions in a less constrained manner (see Gasser, 1986). These workarounds can be 
put in place in a wild way, and depending on the level of knowledge and perceived risk, getting 
the work done sometimes overrides security concerns. 
 
Following a cognitive approach, we believe that virtually every decision is a matter of trade-off. 
Humans do not try to produce perfect responses to the environment. Instead, they tend to 
accept good enough solutions. We think that this conception of human cognitive activities 
applies in computer security, for both attackers and legal users. The former attempt to design 
effective worms or denials of service, for instance. The latter, in turn, try to protect themselves as 
effectively as possible. But in both cases, there are not infinite amounts of resources (e.g. time, 
                                                 
3
 There is a limited amount of uranium that can be put together without initiating fission. When this amount is 
exceeded, a chain reaction occurs, generating potentially lethal radiations. 
4 Generally speaking, narrow tanks prevent unwanted fission reactions. 
money or effort) to allocate to attacking or protecting. This is where human flexibility comes 
into play: people perform an intuitive trade-off between (some form of) cost and (some form of) 
benefits. We will consider some concrete computer examples after having briefly explained how 
the concept of trade-off translates in security. 
3. SECURITY FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 
To better illustrate how we use the concept of trade-off, we represent it graphically in Figure 1. 
The dark area at the lower right-hand corner represents the maximum efficiency where one 
reaches high benefits for low costs. The top left-hand corner, on the contrary, represents a poor 
efficiency where one spends a lot to gain little. Between these two extremities, there is clearly an 
entire continuum. The trade-off line represents a frontier between costs and benefits. Any 
activity above this line will cost more than it rewards. Conversely, any activity below this line will 
reward more than it costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of a costs/benefits trade-off. 
 
Let us now apply the graph to the simple example of a user wanting to configure his or her 
computer. Let us assume that the user has a routine task to do and is considering adding a 
button to a toolbar in order to access a function more quickly. If the button is going to be used 
only one time, the time cost of adding it may be higher than the expected time saved during the 
task. Therefore, it is likely that the button will not be added. On the other hand, if this function 
is to be used repeatedly, the expected benefits may be worth the cost. We are obviously not 
considering dimensions such as adding buttons for the sake of it or for a matter of investigating 
unknown functions. Nevertheless, with this simple example, we claim that humans intuitively, 
though implicitly, evaluate the efficiency of their decisions before they implement them. 
 
There are cases where human actions are given explicit limits. Decisions can be benefit-driven or 
costs-driven (see Figure 2). In the first case, a course of actions is interrupted when some 
functional objective is met. In the other case, the target is set in terms of cost (money, time, etc.) 
and actions will stop when the limit is reached. In both cases, the course of actions never follows 
the straight trade-off line. Instead, we think it fluctuates with time depending on the given phases 
of the work (e.g. software development will hardly show a steady progress rate). 
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Figure 2: Graphical representations of benefits-driven (left) and costs-driven (right) strategies. 
 
Because they constantly try to save cognitive resources while still attempting to reach some level 
of efficiency, humans often implement a least effort rule. In doing so, they attempt to reach an 
acceptable level of performance with the minimal mental effort. As a consequence, decision 
making can become a biased benefits-driven process. When applied to a security-usability trade-
off, usability may come first, hence turning security into a side-issue. This will be discussed in 
section  5.2. 
 
Classically, attackers are said to exploit security holes left open by legal users. In other words, the 
malicious intentions of the attackers are, to some extent, facilitated by the behaviour of some 
legal users. We obviously do not put the blame on them. Neither do we believe that the motives 
that some attackers promote (e.g. learning, curiosity, challenge, etc.) will ever justify any sort of 
damage caused to someone’s data, tool or service. Having said that, security is a two-way issue. 
Merely assessing it from the attacker’s point of view only captures half of the problem (see Arief 
& Besnard, 2003 for a survey on attackers’ techniques and motivations). The other half is about 
how we (legal users) use our computers. 
4. SECURITY TRADE-OFFS BY LEGAL USERS 
In our view, legal users consider the actions required for securing the system from an economic 
point of view and they trade-off security against usability. The increasing number and length of 
passwords, the tedious installation and updating of anti-virus software or the straightforward 
nature of opening email attachments are threats that are introduced in systems and that attackers 
exploit. It does not imply that they can be easily removed but understanding where trade-offs lie 
allow security engineers and software designers to think more about the interest of making 
security products and policies compatible with some intuitive notion of usability. This is not only 
an issue about “comfort of use” but, as we will see in the following sub-sections, is a problem 
that directly impacts security. 
4.1.1. Passwords: a memory issue 
Passwords can be eight characters long or more and because we are making computing more and 
more ubiquitous, we seem to need an increasing number of them. This tendency probably 
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originates from a desire to control accesses more tightly with the hidden assumption that it will 
increase privacy of data. It may also derive from an erroneous belief that long passwords are 
more difficult to crack. When one actually looks at what happens at the workplace, human 
cognitive limitations become obvious: users cannot remember their passwords and need external 
memories (e.g. sticky notes on monitors). This is an instance of a nice paradox where by 
increasing the complexity and number of passwords, the level of privacy actually decreases 
(Weirich & Sasse, 2002). 
User login and passwords to computer accounts are used very often and are the main method to 
get access to systems. In this case, frequency compensates for complexity: the password is used 
often enough to be remembered (Sasse, Brostoff & Weirich, 2001). But how many counter-
examples are there where people have to write down passwords? To cope with this problem, 
operating systems offer to remember passwords. Again, for the sake of usability, a user may be 
tempted to use such storage features (cookies). It is a useful feature but it comes down to the 
user’s judgement as to whether a service or a piece of data is trivial enough so that its password 
can be stored on a computer. Another drawback is that users who rely on cookies may not spend 
effort in remembering their passwords anymore. As a consequence, if somehow the cookies are 
emptied (e.g. when the system is rebuilt), they may lose their password. 
4.1.2. Anti-virus software updates: a risk issue 
Anti-virus protections are useful barriers but only when they are up-to-date. They need some 
attention in this respect. But maintaining, updating and upgrading them has a cost that can 
conflict with end-user’s main task, thereby impacting security. So we think anti-virus protections 
always leave a hole open, the size of which depending, among others, on the frequency of 
updates. Hence risk, which is typically perceived inaccurately by humans, comes into the 
equation at this level. Users or security officers have to accept a certain level of (perceived) 
vulnerability regarding their system. Automatic updates have been felt to tackle this problem by 
lowering the likelihood of holes in the anti-virus protection. Unfortunately, the corruption of this 
service puts high threats on IT systems since it can offer an attacker to automate the installation 
of backdoors or the downloading of harmful contents. For this reason, automatic updates are 
not a panacea. Despite this negative state of facts, large organisations use this feature extensively, 
implicitly assuming that the gain in usability and the regularity of updates together will provide 
benefits that are worth taking the risk.  
4.1.3. Email attachments: a trust issue 
Email attachments have been used very widely for spreading malicious code. Typically, the code 
is added as an attachment to a seemingly benign email. When the attachment is opened, the code 
is executed on the machine, exploiting security holes in the email program. Harmful email 
attachments pose two problems. First, they very often come from trusted third parties who were 
infected themselves. Thus, due to this trust relationship, the degree of suspicion regarding the 
decision to open the document is already low. Second, email attachments are used so widely for 
legitimate purposes that opening them has become as automatic as picking up the phone. Of 
course, a rule such as “do not open attachments you are not expecting or from people you do not know” is 
unworkable since it generates too many false positives: many valid attachments would have to be 
left unread. Again, automation has been felt to tackle this problem: many mail servers now 
include anti-virus scanners. However, this is not the optimum solution since these scanners a) 
sometimes detect false positives and b) open a discussion on whether or not scanning might 
invade privacy. 
5. DISCUSSION 
After having considered some concrete examples based on the use of computers, it seems 
necessary to adopt a broader view and address some more general issues. Among these, accepted 
losses and risks have to be mentioned as security policies are not meant to protect every single 
piece of data or service. Furthermore, threats can be discussed from the standpoint of an 
antagonism between the roles of attackers and legal users. The discrepancy in their motives is 
where security holes lie. Lastly, we will address organisational issues by describing a multi-layered 
notion of systems’ security. 
5.1. Accepted losses, risk perception and systems’ protection 
Although we have reasoned so far under the reductive assumption that all the data have to be 
protected, we now want to highlight a somewhat different picture according to which there exist 
some acceptable losses that humans implicitly take into account in setting up protections. The 
trade-off here involves the cost of protection and the cost of loss (See Flechais & Sasse, year). 
Data or services that can be easily replaced, disclosed or lost without serious consequences will 
probably have a relatively low level of protection. The underlying evaluation of the required level 
of protection is believed to be done in an intuitive manner most of the time. We also think it 
guides, to some extent, the security policies adopted by organisations. As each single piece of 
data cannot be equally protected, some of these data are inevitably left vulnerable to attacks. This 
may be a sensible decision if, as aforementioned, loss or disclosure of data is accepted. In this 
view, it seems important to highlight that protecting a system is a sort of dialogue between 
security officers and attackers. We think security policies define the nature of this dialogue before 
the occurrence of any attack. To some extent, this conception goes against the widespread belief 
according to which “attackers play first”. 
 
IT security shares some similarities with safety that help highlighting the implicit side of risk 
taking. Let us take the following example. A car is safer when it is immobile than when one is 
driving it. But for a car to deliver its service (transporting people and goods), the driver and the 
passengers are forced to expose themselves to risks. These may be reduced down to some 
acceptable level if the driver is careful and experienced. But there will always be a number of 
factors he or she will not be able to influence (other drivers, mechanical incidents, etc.) that will 
impact the level of safety of this situation. The same argument holds with, for instance, a server. 
Not plugging it into a network is a secure condition but the service will not be delivered5. 
Therefore, some risk has to be accepted for virtually any piece of equipment to fulfil its function. 
 
Another problematic situation is one where a threat has been identified by e.g. a software 
developer but found too costly to fix or too unlikely to care about. This applies to an extremely 
wide range of cases. For example, in everyday’s life, we tend not to wear our safety belt when 
driving on very short distances (e.g. parking the car into the garage). This behaviour has a simple 
explanation. We, as individuals, adapt our protection level to the environment as a function of 
the perceived risk. The smaller the perceived risk, the lower the level of protection. However, 
this intuitive and implicit risk analysis is problematic. As humans are typically biased at 
perceiving actual levels of risk and never have an absolutely exhaustive knowledge of the systems 
they interact with, it follows that the impact of a given practice over the security of a system is 
unlikely to be accurately assessed by a user. It implies that these heuristic risk assessments do not 
accurately capture the criticality of certain threats, therefore leaving breaches identification and 
compensation subject to subjective decisions. 
 
                                                 
5 Actually, even disconnecting a machine does not solve all the problems. Social engineering techniques allow the 
attacker to get in through other means, including by getting physical access to the target system. 
Last but not least, there is a human tendency to “slide on the risk slope”. Large security incidents 
or industrial accidents are not caused by a sudden change in security or safety policy. Departure 
from a reasonable level of risk does not happen in one day. It is an accumulation of a number of 
small insecure increments that progressively deteriorate the level of protection, each of which 
being seen as acceptable per se. This is classic in large industrial system’s safety: large-scale 
accidents are made of a concatenation of small failures (Mancini, 1987). 
5.2. Antagonism among security actors 
It seems plausible that attackers, just as legal users do, perform trade-offs in the way they use 
their own computers. They may tend to intuitively and implicitly compare the costs of their 
actions to the expected benefits and then take decisions on the basis of this evaluation. The rule-
of-thumb states that if costs are perceived as worth the expected benefits, then some action is 
likely to be performed. However, because attacker’s and legal users’ motivations are 
fundamentally different, we think that their respective trade-offs are different in nature. 
Attackers attack because they like it and/or get a reward of some sort (self-satisfaction, peer-
recognition, money, etc.). Legal users protect themselves because they need to. As far trade-offs 
are concerned, these motives bring a consequence that attackers may care less about costs than 
legal users do. This discrepancy of motivations may create some room for an increased 
likelihood and/or success of attacks. 
 
As depicted in Figure 3, legal users may prioritise usability with little concern about security. This 
is a common case of usability-driven behaviour. On the attackers’ side, it may be that one is 
focussed on the damages expected from his work with little concern about the costs involved. 
We have represented this discrepancy as a dotted line in the legal users’ trade-off strategy graph 
in Figure 3. Thus, in our conception, the gap lying between attackers’ and legal users’ trade-off 
strategies gives some advantage to attackers. According to this view, the larger the gap, the most 
successful the attack could be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graphical representations of two different trade-off strategies. 
 
From our point of view, a successful attack can therefore be described in terms of a malicious 
action whose degree of refinement is higher than the degree of protection of the target system. 
5.3. Beyond the individual picture… 
So far, we have been concentrating on an individual perspective where cognitive factors are 
thought to play a determinant role. Beyond this picture, we want to acknowledge the collective 
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dimension of security in large distributed computer-based systems. More precisely, we think that 
Reason’s model (1990; see Figure 4) adopts a useful view on organisations in the sense that they 
are described in terms of multi-layered systems. Applied to the field of security, this view can 
help describe a computer-based system as one composed of threats, actors and protection layers. 
With this model, security is described as a multi-layered process where a variety of actors (e.g. 
developers, security officers, end-users…) have a role to play. Each of these actors impact on 
security. Legal end-users, for instance, by not making updates for their anti-virus software, leave 
holes open for attacks. This type of sub-optimal behaviour may exist at any given layer of the 
organisation, for any role. It creates latent security breaches that, combined with each other, can 
defeat an entire system’s protections. In the context of this paper, these breaches are interpreted 
in terms of trade-offs whereby actors simply wish to reach good enough solutions.  
When applied to security, Reason’s model can describe, from a system point of view, the 
impairments made to security by legal users and attackers. The latter attempt to propagate attacks 
through security holes in order to reach an objective such as data, a service or causing disruption 
in the functioning of the system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Successful attacks propagate through several protection layers (adapted from Brostoff & Sasse, 2001). 
 
By quoting this model, our intention is to highlight the combination of factors needed for an 
attack to succeed. According to the popular belief, attacks occur because some malicious people 
exploit security holes. We wish to promote a somewhat different view according to which 
successful attacks are a combination of weak protections and malicious intentions. This idea can 
be stretched even further. As we cannot eliminate attacks altogether, the most productive 
approach may be to regard attacks as the outcomes of flawed policies and/or practices. Their 
origins are deeply rooted within early design decisions or within organisations. For instance, due 
to productivity constraints, the manager of a small company may misjudge the importance of 
protecting IT activities. This can take the form of a backlog of security actions waiting to be 
done. Such a laissez-faire policy may propagate through the various stakeholders of the 
organisational process, leading to e.g. unprotected data or weak passwords. There could 
obviously be an infinite number of examples that would follow the same pattern of a multiple, 
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intricate set of causes (see Brostoff & Sasse, 2001 for more complete views on Reason’s model 
application to security). 
Although an individual approach is useful to assess individual contributions or impairments to 
security, these have to be brought back into a broader picture where security breaches are 
caused, facilitated or maintained by the combination of a variety of causes rather than by mere, 
isolated end-users’ actions. 
6. WHAT CAN WE DO? 
Telling people what to do about security is one option. But one lesson that can be drawn from 
violations in systems is that one should not expect humans to always act as prescribed. Within 
industrial settings, procedures themselves do not rule the human behaviour (Fujita, 2000) and 
there are many ways in which humans can configure a system and use it in unexpected and/or 
unprotected modes, even if it implies implementing a violation (Adams & Sasse, 1999). The 
motivation for doing so may be based on an intuitive cost/benefit evaluation. This is typical for 
passwords that are written down or passed on to colleagues. It is also true for harmful email 
attachments that happen to hit computer-aware staff in academic departments every now and 
then. Generally speaking, if the perceived risk attached to an illegal action (e.g. lending a 
password) is seen as lower than the expected benefits (e.g. gain in time), then a violation will be 
put in place. This is extremely common practice and goes well beyond computer security. In this 
trade-off, factors such as security culture and risk perception are key notions. And whether or 
not the user has a relevant knowledge of the potential consequences of his/her actions is what 
partly determines the level of risk involved and the final security of the system. Thus educating 
users, although it will not solve all the problems, gives them the opportunity to better understand 
the consequences of their actions, hence making them less prone or susceptible to security 
attacks. 
6.1. Summary 
If it is true that cognition is a matter of trade-offs, we then have to modify the balance of the 
factors that compose them. As far as legal users are concerned, one may want to act so as to 
increase security without impairing usability. We think that adopting a trade-off approach allows 
one to look at security as a balance. Identifying which are the factors involved and which are 
their respective weights in the decisions taken is hoped to constitute a progress towards better 
protections. 
 
Here are the points the we have defended in this paper: 
• Trade-offs are sometimes implemented in a wild, uncontrolled manner. Legal users 
sometimes prioritise immediate benefits to the detriment of long-term security. 
• Passwords, anti-virus updates and email attachments respectively raise such issues as 
memory limitations, risk and trust. 
• Security does not imply protecting everything since some losses are acceptable. However, 
because risk perception by humans is highly biased, valuable data could be under threats. 
• Trade-offs by legal users differ in nature from the ones performed by attackers. The 
resulting gap creates or maintains security breaches. 
• Computer security is an organisational matter. 
6.2. Recommendations 
To put things simply, humans obey least-effort rules because they are cognitive machines that 
attempt to cheaply reach flexible objectives rather than to act perfectly towards fixed targets. As 
a consequence, each time an opportunity to do so arises, cognitive resources are saved. This rule 
is sometimes applied even to the detriment of performance or accuracy. From our point of view, 
anything that can push legal users into trading off security against anything else is harmful. In our 
opinion, this leads to some simple recommendations. 
• Educate staff. As we stated earlier, education will not solve all the problems but will at least 
allow users to be aware of the consequences of their actions. Tell staff how some email 
attachments may contain harmful code. Explain how intrusions are performed. Highlight 
the importance of memorising passwords.  
• Security must be user-centred (Zurko & Simon, 1996). Following the previous point, 
passwords must be, at least, easy to remember and reduced in number as much as 
possible. As far as end-users are concerned, the ideal number of passwords is zero. It 
may seem an unworkable view to security officers but the reason why security policies 
have to be enforced to humans is because they require an effort from them. To this 
respect, any measure getting closer to an effortless security policy is a step forward. 
• Security is not end-users’ task. How secure a system is partly depends on how high security is 
set on the scale of objectives. If security is a relatively obvious goal for a security officer, 
it is not the case for an end-user. Solutions have to be thought of in order to make 
security transparent for whom it is not a primary objective. 
• Do not set contradictory objectives. Asking staff to carry out their duty and spend time on 
updates and/or scanning files cannot be done at the same time and have to be traded-off 
against each other. Do not impose contradictory objectives. Security does not come first 
in end-users’ mind (See Sasse, Brostoff & Weirich, 2001). 
As a summary of these short recommendations, end-users will always have something else to do 
than think about security. It seems to us that the idea of a user-centred security for end-users is a 
useful policy driver. Any measure going in this direction will improve systems’ security. 
7. LIMITS 
One of the issues this paper does not address is how cognitive flexibility eventually contributes 
to security. In previous sections, we have seen how trade-offs between e.g. usability and security 
could impair a system’s level of protection. This surely accounts for the success of some 
intrusions. But this aspect of human functioning can be seen in a more positive way as not 
complying to the rules can also generate beneficial behaviours (Besnard & Greathead, 2002). 
According to this view, violations are reconsidered under the angle of ad-hoc contributions to 
security, happening under exceptional circumstances and outside the frame of any clearly 
identified procedure. Several examples can be mentioned. One is unplugging the network cable 
from a connected machine when a suspicious behaviour is noticed. It may not preclude any 
damage on this specific computer but it will prevent the attack to spread to other machines. This 
is the type of actions that designers probably do not expect users to take but that can nonetheless 
be implemented on-the-fly, thanks to human’s intrinsic flexibility. This kind of unexpected 
contribution to security is hardly ever addressed in computer security but nevertheless deserves 
some attention. 
8. CONCLUSION 
One conclusion we can reach in this paper is that when legal users impair the level of protection 
of a system, they do not always do it because of a pure lack of knowledge or because they 
explicitly disregard security. It simply is that legal users who are not security-aware (e.g. 
researchers, clerical staff, managers) have other tasks to perform than spending their work time 
on securing their system. If asked to do so, they might consider security as getting in the way to 
the completion of their main tasks and will probably not bother scanning data for viruses if this 
allows them to work faster. Harmful usability-driven trade-offs are then put in place and this 
creates holes in systems’ protections. Interestingly enough, the same argument applies to 
attackers but in a slightly different way. They care about the time and efforts they allocate to a 
given attack with regards to the expected benefits. Thus, when attacks or intrusions fail, it is not 
always because attackers are incompetent. Instead, they may be faced with e.g. technical 
problems during an intrusion that would be too long to surmount given their level of 
competence, available time, or expected reward. 
Understanding where trade-offs lie can allow a better understanding of the mental processes 
involved in security practices. In the case of legal users, we speculate that security is impaired 
because it is traded-off against usability or efficiency. 
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